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FROM TELEGRAPHS TO CONTENT PROTECTION: THE
EVOLUTION OF SIGNALS AS PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Scott Bloebaum'
The patentability of communication signals under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 first came before the Supreme Court in relation to Samuel
Morse's telegraph. Contrary to the Court's ruling in O'Reilly v.
Morse, however, the Federal Circuit recently held in In re Nuijten
that useful, man-made signals are unpatentable because they do
not fit within any of § 101's enumerated invention categories. As
this Comment argues, the holding in Nuijten is based on artificial,
overly narrow, and self-contradictory distinctions that are
inconsistent with the expansive interpretation of § 101 mandated
by the Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Diamond v. Diehr.
The holding in Nuijten also conflicts with the WTO's Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"),
and is likely to impact substantive rights of inventors and frustrate
important goals of patent reform, a current priority of both
Congress and the executive branch.
I. INTRODUCTION
Samuel B. Morse, a Yale-educated portrait painter, built his
first telegraph machine in 1835 in his spare time from his position
'J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2009. Ph.D.,
Electrical and Computer Engineering, North Carolina State University. The
author wishes to thank Daniel P. Homiller of Coats & Bennett P.L.L.C. and
Professor Andrew Chin of UNC School of Law for their valuable comments and
critiques on the substance and form of this paper. Also, the author is grateful to
European patent attorney Olle Lindberg of Sony Ericsson Mobile
Communications AB for his helpful guidance on European patent law. The
author also wishes to thank Chris Lightner and the other members of the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology editorial staff for their valuable
suggestions. The author reserves his deepest gratitude, however, for his wife,
Nancy, and children, Elena and Adam, for their support while he was writing
this paper.
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as a professor of art at New York University. 2 Although he did not
succeed in making the telegraph work over a significant distance
until 1838, Morse applied for his first patent on the telegraph in
1837, which was granted as U.S. Patent No. 1647 in 1840.' After
receiving a grant from Congress in 1842 to develop the invention,
Morse finally crossed the threshold of fame in 1844 when he
transmitted the now-famous "What hath God wrought" message
from the U.S. Supreme Court chambers in Washington, D.C., to
his assistant in Baltimore. Morse's original patent was reissued
with amendments in 1846 and 1848.'
Imitation and infringement followed as others attempted to
exploit Morse's invention by installing telegraph systems across
the United States. Morse responded through the courts, filing his
first infringement suit in 1849 against Henry O'Reilly, who had
installed a telegraph system in Kentucky and Tennessee in 1845.
After the circuit court found Morse's patent to be valid and
infringed,' O'Reilly appealed to the Supreme Court which heard
O'Reilly v. Morse in 1853. Although the Court held that Morse's
claim'o to all use of electromagnetic power distance
2 LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH: A HISTORY OF MORSE'S INVENTION AND ITS
PREDECESSORS IN THE UNITED STATES 28-29 (1993), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=pzkZPIXm89UC; Stephen G. Kunin &
Bradley D. Lytle, Patent Eligibility of Signal Claims, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 991, 992 (2005).
3 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 992.
4 Id. at 993; see also Mary G. Bellis, The History of the Telegraph and
Telegraphy, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bltelegraph.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (noting that the first message actually was sent from Baltimore to
Washington on May 1, 1844, announcing that the Whig Party had selected
Henry Clay as its presidential candidate).
5 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 992.
6 Id. at 993.
7 Morse v. O'Reilly, 17 F. Cas. 871 (C.C.D. Ky. 1848) (No. 9859); see also
Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 993.
8 Morse, 17 F. Cas. at 872.
956 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
'o The claims are the section of a patent that defines the bounds of the actual
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall conclude with one
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.").
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communication was overly broad," it upheld a claim for a "system
of signs . . . for telegraphic purposes."2 This decision generally is
considered the first instance of a signal being found patentable."
Now fast-forward to the present, where advances such as the
transistor, the integrated circuit, and digital computing and
communications have relegated the telegraph to the role of a
museum artifact. These advances have facilitated the creation of
the Internet, a worldwide communications network through which
the public can share many different types of information almost
instantaneously. While a benefit to society in general, the
Internet's speed and ubiquity presents many challenges to
copyright holders by enabling Internet users to propagate content
cheaply, easily, and widely. Copyright holders have responded to
these challenges in a variety of ways, notably through the use of
content-protection techniques generally known as digital rights
management ("DRM").14 While DRM takes many different forms,
the particular form of interest in this discussion is digital
watermarking. In digital watermarking, a secondary data signal
containing copyright or security information is embedded in a
primary data signal containing multimedia content." With
knowledge of the watermark, devices receiving a file containing
the primary data signal can detect the presence, absence, or
modification of the secondary watermark signal and respond
" O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 119-20.
12 Id. at 86, 95.
" Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 994.
14 See Marc Fisher, Download Uproar: Recording Industry Goes After Personal
Use, WASH. PosT, Dec. 30, 2007, at MO5 (describing RIAA's tactic of
threatening legal action against individuals who make "unauthorized" digital
copies of legally purchased CDs); Wade Roush, Inside the Spyware Scandal,
TECH. REV., May 2006, at 48, available at http://www.technologyreview.com/
Biztech/16812/ (describing Sony-BMG's attempt to distribute CDs with
embedded DRM known as "rootkit"); Steve Jobs, Chief Executive Officer,
Apple, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughtsonmusic (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (discussing Apple's strategy with respect to its proprietary Fairplay
DRM).
15 See Digital Watermarking Alliance, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
digitalwatermarkingalliance.org/faqs.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2008) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
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appropriately by protecting the content carried on the primary data
signal.' 6
Just like Morse's telegraph signals in O'Reilly, digital
watermark signals reached a nexus with patent law in the recent
case of In re Nuiften." In this case, the Federal Circuit considered
the familiar question of whether a signal is patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.'" In contrast with the Supreme
Court in O'Reilly, the court in Nuiften-despite having the benefit
of 150 years of precedent and experiencing firsthand the recent
technological revolution in computers and communications-
narrowly construed § 101 and held that signals are per se
unpatentable because they do not fall into any particular category
of invention enumerated in the statute." This Comment argues
that the majority in Nuiten created artificial, overly narrow, and
self-contradictory distinctions between patentable and unpatentable
subject matter under § 101. These distinctions are inconsistent not
only with the controlling Supreme Court interpretations of § 101,
but also with other recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court case
law and Congress's expressed intent behind the patent statutes.
Furthermore, by elevating form above substance, the Nuiten
opinion arguably places unnecessary burdens on both patent
applicants and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"),
thereby frustrating important goals of patent reform, a current
priority for both Congress and the executive branch.
Part II of this Comment presents background material
including the judicial interpretation of § 101, the definition of a
"signal" and its relationship to computer programs, strategies for
claiming inventions involving signals, and a brief history of case
law on patentability of signals up to and including Nuiten. Part III
presents a detailed analysis of the majority and dissenting opinions
in Nuiten in view of the background material discussed in Part II
as well as the recent Supreme Court decision in KSR International
'6 Id.
" 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
'" Id. at 1348.
9 Id. at 1357.
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Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.20 Part III then discusses how the patentability
doctrine in Nuiten aligns with European patent law and
Congress's intent behind the legislation implementing the TRIPS
agreement. The last section of Part III assesses how the holdings
of Nuiten are likely to impact the rights of inventors, the important
goals of patent reform, or perhaps both. Finally, Part IV summarizes
the information and analysis presented in Parts II and III and
briefly discusses a new case 2' before the Federal Circuit that
eventually may impact the holdings of Nuilten.
II. BACKGROUND
The Constitution grants Congress broad powers to enact laws
that "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."22 Congress first
responded to this grant by enacting the Patent Act of 1790, which
enabled the executive branch to grant a patent to "any person ...
[who has] invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture,
engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before
known or used." 23 This initial statute further emphasized that the
granting committee 24 must find the invention or discovery
"sufficiently useful and important" as a prerequisite to granting the
patent.25 Congress amended this statutory language several times
including significant changes in 1793, 1836, 1870, and most
recently, 1952.26
The current statutes governing the granting of patents are
contained in various sections of title 35,27 but the main
20 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
21 See In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3246 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 15, 2008).
22 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (repealed 1836).
24 This committee initially was composed of the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General. Id.
25 Id.
26 See Sam S. Han, Analyzing the Patentability of "Intangible" yet "Physical"
Subject Matter, 3 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REv. 2, 8-11 (2002) (describing the
history of revisions to the patent statutes).
27 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2000).
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requirements for patentability are found in four specific sections.
First, § 101 specifies the scope of patentable subject matter:
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title."28
The most important "conditions and requirements" mentioned
in § 101 are those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112. Section 102 sets
forth a number of conditions related to prior public knowledge,
sale, use, and patenting of an invention that must be met in order
for the invention to be considered "novel" and thus patentable.2 9
Furthermore, § 103 requires that an invention be "non-obvious" in
order to be patentable. 30  Finally, § 112 requires the inventor to
describe his or her invention to a degree that will "enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains .. . to make and use"
the invention.3 ' This requirement has been referred to as the patent
holder's consideration in the patent bargain.32
A. Judicial Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 101
While all of the statutory sections mentioned above contain
important requirements for patentability of an invention, § 101 is
arguably the most important because it is the initial door through
which an applicant must pass. 3 If this door is too narrow or
restrictive, the limitations or restrictions of §§ 102, 103, and 112
become almost irrelevant. On the other hand, courts have long
been wary of opening the door too widely at the risk of removing
from the public domain the "basic tools of scientific and
technological work."34 Consequently, courts have continuously
28 Id. § 101 (emphasis added).29 Id. § 102.
30 Id. § 103. The Supreme Court recently interpreted the non-obviousness
requirement of § 103 in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727
(2007). See infra Part III.B.
3'35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
32 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
3 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("The first door which
must be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101."), vacated as moot
sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (mem.).
34 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
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struggled to define the scope of patentable subject matter under
§ 101, and as a result two conflicting viewpoints have emerged
from Supreme Court and Federal Circuit case law, as discussed in
this section below.
The telegraph in O'Reilly provided an initial opportunity for
the Supreme Court to define the bounds of patentable subject
matter. While the Supreme Court allowed Morse's patent claim
for the "system of signs," the majority opinion held that the claim
covering the "use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic
current ... for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or
letters, at any distances" was overly broad because it attempted to
claim a principle of nature." On the other hand, the dissent in
O'Reilly would have allowed that same claim on the basis that the
invention made an existing law of nature "the servant of man ...
[applied] to the perfecting of a new and useful art."" The Court
later clarified this distinction in Dolbear v. American Bell
Telephone Co." by holding that electricity could be patentable
subject matter if the invention embodied a particular process of use
rather than a general application of a principle of nature, as Morse
attempted to do with telegraphy."
While the Supreme Court's holding in Dolbear emphasized
practical usefulness as a requirement for patentability, the Court
later retreated somewhat from this position in American Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co.39 In dealing with a patented process
for treating oranges to prevent mold growth, the Court held in
American Fruit that a useful application of a scientific principle
was not necessarily patentable subject matter.4 0 Instead, the
invention must produce a change in form, quality, property,
character, or use in order to be patentable.4'
3 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1854).
36 Id. at 132 (referring to electromagnetism being used for telegraphy).
3 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
38 Id. at 534 (distinguishing O'Reilly from the case before the court); see Han,
supra note 26, at 21-22.
3 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
40 Id. at 11 (noting the principle that an orange could be made resistant to blue
mold decay when its skin was impregnated with borax).
41 Id. at 11-13.
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The emergence of digital computing brought before the courts
a number of questions related to the patentability of algorithms
implemented in computer hardware or software. In Gottschalk v.
Benson,42 the Supreme Court considered patent claims relating to a
method for converting numbers from one format into another by an
algorithm implemented on a digital computer.43 The Court analogized
algorithms to laws of nature-in particular Morse's use of
electromagnetism for telegraphy 4 4-which under O'Reilly and
Dolbear were unpatentable due to the policy of ensuring that the
"basic tools of scientific and technological work" are available to
the public.45 The Court concluded that the same policy considerations
applied to algorithms implemented as computer programs when
such algorithms had "no substantial practical application" except
when implemented in a computer.46 Lower courts, however, have
interpreted Benson narrowly based on this particular language.4 7
The Supreme Court also considered the scope of § 101 in
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.4 8 In considering a conflict
between state trade secret law and federal patent law, the Court
stated that "no patent is available for a discovery, however useful,
novel, and non[-]obvious, unless it falls within one of the express
categories of patentable subject matter" in § 101.49 Some lower
courts have interpreted and applied this language as an additional
requirement for inventions to achieve a categorical fit as either a
42 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
43 Id. at 65. Interestingly, the Court used the word "signals" to describe the
numerical data being converted.
4 4 Id. at 68.
45 Id. at 67.
46 Id. at 7 1.
47 See In re Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1977) ("Because it did
not consider the performance of an algorithm by a computer as constituting a
practical application of that algorithm under the rule, the Court must have
viewed Benson's claims as effectively claiming the 'effect,' principle, or law or
force of nature (the algorithm) itself.").
48 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
49 Id. at 483.
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process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in order
to pass through the door of § 101 .L
Nevertheless, there is an important line of precedent that
properly takes a more expansive view of the scope of patentable
subject matter under § 101 than the line of cases discussed above.
In In re Musgrave," the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
("CCPA") considered a claim for a method for correcting seismic
data.52 The court held that the only requirement for an invention to
be considered patentable subject matter is that it must be among
the "technological arts" so as to be aligned with the Constitutional
purpose of promoting the progress of "useful arts."" This
venerable phrase from the Patent Clause also has been interpreted
by modem courts to mean "technological innovation."5 4
The leading case supporting an expansive interpretation of the
scope of patentable subject matter is Diamond v. Chakrabarty." In
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court considered the patentability of a
non-naturally-occurring strain of bacteria that had been developed
by a research scientist employed by General Electric." The Court
examined the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 and
concluded that by enacting those laws, Congress intended § 101 to
provide an expansive scope for patentable subject matter-namely
"anything under the sun that is made by man."5 ' The Court noted,
however, that § 101 did not include every discovery and reaffirmed
three specific exceptions that had been held to be unpatentable in
earlier cases-abstract ideas, laws of nature, and mathematical
50 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[F]or the purposes of a § 101 analysis, ... [the type of claim
is irrelevant] as long as it falls within at least one of the four enumerated
categories of patentable subject matter. . .
s' 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
52 Id. at 884. The CCPA was the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which was established in 1982.
" Id. at 893.
54 1n re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Paulik v.
Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
1 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
5 Id. at 305.
5 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-
1923, at 6 (1952)).
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formulas." Based on these criteria, the Court held that the
genetically-engineered organism at issue was patentable under
§ 101 because it was "a product of human ingenuity having a
distinctive name, character [and] use."" Thus, under Chakrabarty,
an invention satisfies the "new" requirement of § 101 if it was the
result of human ingenuity rather than an already-existing formula
or principle that was merely discovered.60 Furthermore, the
opinion cautioned lower courts to avoid reading limitations into the
patent laws unless such limitations are clearly expressed by
Congress in the legislative history.6 1
The Supreme Court affirmed Chakrabarty's expansive
language the following year in Diamond v. Diehr.62 In Diehr, the
Court held that an invention incorporating a mathematical
algorithm or formula satisfies the requirements of § 101 if the
invention "implements or applies that formula in a structure or
process which, when considered as a whole, is performing a
function which the patent laws were designed to protect." 63
Specifically, if the process has practical utility, the fact that it
includes a mathematical algorithm or equation does not remove it
from the scope of § 101.64 Thus, Diehr stands for the proposition
that in addition to being a product of human ingenuity, an
invention also must have a practical application in order to be
patentable 6 5-in other words, it must meet the "useful"
58 Id.
9 Id. at 310.
60 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., dissenting)
("[T]he term 'new' in § 101 [establishes] a separate requirement that statutory
subject matter be a type of invention that can be described as a 'new' creation
rather than the discovery of a pre-existing principle."), reh'g en banc denied,
515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
61 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
62450 U.S. 175 (1981).63 Id. at 192.
6 Id. at 187-88 ("[W]hen a process for curing rubber is devised which
incorporates in it a more efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the
very least not barred at the threshold by § 101.").
65 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("In Diehr, the Court explained that certain types of
[VOL. 9: 243252
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requirement of § 101. Lower courts generally have followed this
interpretation of § 101 in later decisions, including several
decisions relating to the patentability of mathematical algorithms
implemented in digital computers.66
In summary, the key distinction between the expansive and
narrow views of patentable subject matter under § 101 is whether
the four enumerated categories-process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter-should be interpreted broadly to be co-
extensive with "anything under the sun that is made by man" that
has practical utility," or narrowly as an additional limitation on
this broad scope. It is important to note that neither Chakrabarty
nor Diehr explicitly overruled Benson and earlier cases supporting
the narrow view." Thus, although the expansive view appears to
be dominant in Federal Circuit cases relating to inventions that
push the boundaries of § 101,69 the narrow view occasionally
appears as it did in Nuiten.
B. What Exactly Is a "Signal"?
A signal may be defined in a technical sense as "any physical
quantity that varies with time, space, or any other variable."" A
more functional definition, however, is that a signal is a means to
accomplish the fundamental human need to communicate or
convey information to others beyond the range of sight or
hearing." Fire signals have been used extensively for this purpose
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more than
abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application . . .
66 See infra Part II.D.
67 See I DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.01 (2007) ("The general
purpose of the statutory classes of subject matter is to limit patent protection to
the field of applied technology, what the United States Constitution calls 'the
useful arts.' ").
68 See Han, supra note 26, at 44.
69 See infra Part 1.D; see also CHISUM, supra note 67, § 1.01 ("The four old
classes of statutory subject matter have proved to be quite flexible. They have
been interpreted so as to cover most of the new technologies that evolved during
the last 200 years.").
70 JOHN G. PROAKIS & DMITRIS G. MANOLAKIs, DIGITAL SIGNAL PROCESSING
PRINCIPLES, ALGORITHMS, AND APPLICATIONS 2 (2d ed. 1992).
7 COE, supra note 2, at 2.
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for nearly 2000 years, and accounts from as early as 480 B.C.
mention reflected sunlight being used for signaling.7 2 Prior to
Morse's electric telegraph, visual telegraph systems involving
movable displays and a series of relay towers had been used to
transmit information over long distances."
Morse's electric telegraph invention was groundbreaking in
two distinct ways. First, it attempted to harness the invisible force
of electricity for an application that previously had been done
visually. 4 Second, Morse's "system of signs" was the first "letter
code" in which symbols were assigned to represent individual
letters of the English alphabet." Although not visible, the electric
telegraph signals were physical manifestations of electromagnetic
energy that directly conveyed intelligible information by variations
in electric current caused by Morse's code."
This physical nature is equally apparent in signals used in
modern communication systems that transmit information over
radio waves, through optical fibers, or on copper wires between
chips on a printed circuit board in a digital computer. It is important,
however, to distinguish between the signal and its "carrier" in such
systems. Although the two are often conflated, the signal is more
properly defined as the information component while the carrier
represents the electromagnetic wave or energy that conveys the
72 Id. at 2-3.
1 Id. at 5-6.
74 Morse's 1848 reissue application included the following statement:
Various modes of telegraphing, or making signs or signals at a
distance, have for ages been in use. The signs employed heretofore
have had one quality in common. They are evanescent-shown or
heard a moment, and leaving no trace of their having existed .... I do
not, therefore, claim to be the inventor of telegraphs generally .... The
original and final object of my telegraph is to imprint characters at any
distance as signals for intelligence; its object is to mark or impress
them in a permanent manner. To obtain this end, I have applied
electricity in two distinct ways.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 87 (1854).
7 COE, supra note 2, at 9.
76 See O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 117 ("Professor Morse ... has been
able, by a new combination of known powers, of which electro-magnetism is
one, to discover a method by which intelligible marks or signs may be printed at
a distance.").
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signal to the intended recipient." In an FM radio transmission, for
instance, the electromagnetic radio wave having a frequency of
91.5 megahertz is the radio-frequency carrier that conveys the
audible signal consisting of speech, music, and other sounds."
This audible signal is an example of an "analog" signal that
varies continuously over time." In order to process this signal with
an algorithm implemented in a digital computer, the analog signal
must be converted into a digital signal by sampling it at discrete
points in time.so This first digital signal can then be processed
directly to create a second digital signal,"' which may be stored for
future processing, including conversion back to an analog signal.82
While the first digital signal is a direct representation of the analog
signal (e.g., speech, music, or video), the second digital signal is a
new creation that has been given a new form (e.g., compressed to
require less capacity for storage or transmission) or new properties
(e.g., embedded with a digital watermark). Likewise, the second
n See ALAN V. OPPENHEIM & RONALD W. SCHAFER, DIGITAL SIGNAL
PROCESSING 6 (1975) (defining a signal as "a function that conveys information,
generally about the state or behavior of a physical system" (emphasis added));
JOHN G. PROAKIS, DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 164 (2d ed. 1989) (distinguishing
between information and carrier components of a signal).
78 There are certain physical signals that do not utilize carriers; these are often
referred to as "bitstreams" or "baseband signals." See PROAKIS, supra note 77, at
164. One example of a baseband signal is a stream of digital data that is
transmitted between chips on a printed circuit board found in a digital computer.
79 PROAKIS & MANOLAKIS, supra note 70, at 4.
80 Id. at 2-4. Note that the term "digital computer" is used broadly here to
denote both general- and special-purpose digital computing systems, including
those found in consumer devices such as cellular phones, MP3 players, gaming
systems, etc.
81 This step generally describes a field of study known as "digital signal
processing," an area of applied mathematics that has grown rapidly since the
1970s due to the improvements of digital computing technology. See id. at 1;
see also OPPENHEIM & SCHAFER, supra note 77, at 1-5 (discussing the historical
development of this field).
82 For example, an analog music signal may be sampled and stored on a
compact disk and later processed by an algorithm, known as an encoder, to
create an MP3 file that is stored on another disk. This file subsequently may be
processed by another algorithm, known as a decoder, to recreate its original
analog format for playback to a listener.
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digital signal may be transmitted by using it to affect changes to
certain properties of a carrier.13
Signals are similar to mathematical algorithms in that both
often are expressed entirely as seemingly abstract mathematical
formulas.8 4 The two play complementary roles, however, in the
context of digital computing and communications. While an
algorithm expresses a mathematical function or process to be
performed, a digital signal often is the input to or result of that
function or process. Furthermore, even though a digital signal may
seem abstract, it often is either a direct or indirect representation of
a physical process." These distinctions are important to understanding
patentability of signals, as discussed further below.
C. Claiming Strategies for Inventions Involving Signals
Although a general discussion on the principles of patent claim
drafting is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is helpful for the
subsequent analysis to consider various ways in which signals
were claimed in patents that were granted prior to Nuiten. One
approach is to claim a signal that is imposed upon a carrier wave.86
This type of claim structure is intended to create a formally
tangible embodiment of the signal in the same manner as a claim
for a mathematical algorithm encoded on a computer-readable
medium." Prior to Nuiften, the USPTO explicitly recognized that
"computer data signals embodied in a carrier wave" were
patentable subject matter, regardless of whether the embodiment in
83 For instance, the information may be used to produce controlled changes in
the frequency of a radio transmission (known as "frequency modulation" or
"FM") or in the intensity or amplitude of a light source used for fiber-optic
transmission (known as "amplitude modulation" or "AM"). See PROAKIS, supra
note 77, at 164.
84 See Han, supra note 26, at 2.
85 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text describing the digital and
analog representations of the music signal.
86 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 996.
87 id.
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an electromagnetic carrier wave was "transitory and ephemeral in
nature.""
Another technique that has been successful in obtaining a
patent is to claim the signal in the form of structural components,
often arranged in a specified order.89 In some cases, rather than
recite a carrier or any other formalities intended to imply
tangibility, the claimed structure has been coupled with an
intended function or use." In other cases, however, a claim
combining a signal structure with a carrier wave has been
sufficient to constitute patentable subject matter.9
Finally, a third way to claim a signal is as a product of a series
of actions. This type of claim structure is known as "product-by-
process" and is generally accepted by the USPTO as a way to
claim a product or article by the steps needed to create or produce
it.92 The claim below illustrates how this approach has been used
to claim a digital signal:
A coded video signal generated according to a method, comprising:
recognizing video objects from video data; recognizing instances of a
video object at given times as video object planes (VOPs); assigning
VOPs to one or more video object layers; coding data for one of the
video object layers, the coding comprising: generating a start code that
marks the one video object layer, generating a layer [ID] field that
uniquely identifies the one video object layer, and coding the VOPs in
88 Id. (quoting materials used by the USPTO to train examiners); Ex parte
Rice, No. 2002-1554, Application No. 08/003,996 (B.P.A.I., argued Feb. 13,
2003) (non-precedential).
89 See Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 997.
90 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,052,150, col.55 1.16 (filed Dec. 31, 1998)
(reciting a "video data signal for use in a video coding apparatus").
9' U.S. Patent No. 6,505,032, col.14 1.60 (filed Oct. 10, 2000) (reciting a
"computer data signal embodied in a carrierless ultra wideband waveform
including wavelets having predetermined shapes").
92 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURES § 2113 (8th ed., rev. 6, 2007) [hereinafter MPEP] (noting that
product-by-process claims are limited only by the structure implied by the steps,
which must be considered when determining patentability under §§ 102 and
103). Note that a product is synonymous with the statutory category of
"manufacture" or "article of manufacture."
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the one video object layer; and outputting the start code, the layer id
field and coded VOP data as the coded data signal.
The italicized portions indicate the actions used to create the coded
video signal product. The signal in this claim is not tied to any
particular carrier but rather represents the output of a process,
which may be claimed separately in the same patent.94 The signal
claim at issue in Nuiften was written in product-by-process
format. 95
In summary, there are several approaches for claiming signals
that have been accepted by the USPTO as compliant with the
requirements of § 101. Few of these approaches, however, had
been considered by the Federal Circuit or the CCPA prior to
Nuiften.
D. Patentability of Signals-A Brief Summary ofPrior Case Law
After O'Reilly, one of the first instances where a court
considered the nature and properties of signals was in In re
Musgrave. The issue before the CCPA in Musgrave was the
patentability of a method for processing seismic data by using a
mathematical approach implemented by computing equipment."
The court distinguished between signals that represent information
or data and signals that represent the "state of a physical or
material thing," declaring the former category to be "abstract[] and
intangible."9 7 The court implied that the latter category may be
sufficiently physical to be patentable subject matter, at least as part
of a method claim.
93 U.S. Patent No. 6,707,949, col.16 1.57 (filed Jan. 6, 2003) (emphasis
added); see also U.S. Patent No. 6,556,625, col.14 1.2 (filed Aug. 31, 2001)
(reciting a "coded data signal generated according to" a described process).
94 See Ex parte Nuijten, No. 2003-0853, 2006 WL 3939192, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1335, 1336 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2006) (non-precedential) (reciting a
patentable method claim corresponding to the signal claim at issue in the case).
9 See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh 'g en banc
denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
96 In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 887 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
97 Id. at 886-87.
9' Han, supra note 26, at 58.
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The CCPA encountered the same issue of the patentability of
method claims involving signals in In re Foster.99 The court
defined a signal based on its ability to transmit or convey
information-either as an "event or occurrence" or a "visual, aural,
or other indication."' 0 Applying these definitions and the holding
in Musgrave, the court held that methods involving signals were
patentable subject matter regardless of whether the signals were
recognized as being "limited to machine implementation.""0 ' Thus,
Foster arguably supports the inference that non-physical,
information-bearing signals are also patentable subject matter.'0 2
Nevertheless, the CCPA seemed to retreat somewhat from this
position in In re Walter,"' in which it considered another invention
claiming both a system and a method for processing seismic
signals.'" The court characterized the claimed system for processing
signals as "pure mathematics" rather than "any particular art or
technology."' The court's statement appears to be based, at least
in part, on the failure of the claims to relate the signals to a
representation of a physical quantity.o' This approach effectively
affirmed the "technological arts" criteria for patentable subject
matter that the CCPA previously articulated in Musgrave.0 o
After Walter, the CCPA and Federal Circuit heard no other
cases related to the patentability of signals under § 101 until
Nuitten. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit heard a number of
significant cases related to the issue of whether, and under what
conditions, computer-implemented algorithms fell within the scope
of § 101.' While not necessarily controlling on signal patentability,
99 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
'
00 Id. at 1016.
'o' Id.
102 Cf Han, supra note 26, at 58 (stating that Foster held that signals are
patentable subject matter).
103 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
'04 Id. at 760-61.
'os Id. at 770.
106 Id. (distinguishing the claims at issue from those allowed in an earlier case
that were directed toward enhancing digital data in seismic records by
processing "physical signals representing physical phenomena").
107 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
1os See infra notes 110-26 and accompanying text.
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the opinions in these cases are nonetheless instructive considering
the relationship between digital signals and algorithms, as
discussed in Part II.B.109
In In re Alappat,i' the Federal Circuit considered the issue of
whether a device that used a computer-implemented algorithm to
create a smooth waveform for display on a laboratory instrument
was patentable subject matter under § 101."' In reversing the
USPTO appeals board, the court stated that the proper test for
determining whether an invention fell under the "mathematical
formula" exception of Chakrabarty was whether the "claimed
subject matter as a whole was a disembodied mathematical
concept."" 2 The court went on to hold that the claimed device met
the requirements of § 101 because it was not a disembodied
mathematical concept but rather a machine that produced a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result."" Furthermore, several of the
concurring Alappat opinions articulated the proposition that the
scope of patentable subject matter is determined by technological
utility.114
The Federal Circuit again considered the issue of the
patentability of a machine that included a computer-implemented
mathematical algorithm in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group."' The invention at issue was a data-
processing system, known as "Hub and Spoke," programmed with
software to calculate a daily asset allocation between two or more
109 It is also important to note that Musgrave, Foster, and Walter were decided
before the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of § 101 in Chakrabarty,
while the Federal Circuit cases on patentability of computer algorithms were
decided after that landmark case.
"o 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
...Id. at 1537.
112 Id. at 1544.
" Id.
114 Id. at 1552 (Archer, C.J., & Nies, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating that "patent law rewards persons for inventing technologically
useful applications instead of philosophizing"); id. at 1569 (Newman, J.,
concurring) (stating that "mathematics is ... a vehicle of applied technology"
and noting that the Board's rejection was improper because it failed to recognize
that the invention was a "practical application").
.s 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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mutual funds that had pooled their individual assets into a
partnership fund."6 The system also provided other financial
metrics such as gain, loss, income, expenses, and share price."' In
reversing the district court's holding that the patent was invalid
under § 101, the Federal Circuit applied Alappat and held that
transforming financial data by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share price was patentable
under § 101 because it produced a "useful, concrete, and tangible
result.""' The fact that the invention's result was merely a number
that was only "momentarily fixed" did not render it abstract or
intangible and thus make the invention unpatentable under the
Alappat test."9 Instead, the determinative factor for the court in
State Street was the number's practical utility, illustrated by the
fact that it was relied upon by regulatory agencies.'20
In AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,'2 1 the Federal
Circuit considered the related issue of whether a process that
included a computer- implemented mathematical algorithm was
within the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101.122 The
process at issue generated a data field (the "PIC") that represented
a caller's primary long-distance carrier and added the PIC to the
record of a long-distance call.'23 At the outset, the court stated that
the scope of § 101 was the same regardless of whether an invention
is claimed as a machine or a process.124 The court then applied the
State Street test and held that the process at issue fell comfortably
within the scope of § 101 since, as a whole, it produced a "useful,
concrete, and tangible result."'25 Therefore, even though the PIC
116 Id. at 1370-71. The individual mutual funds were the "spokes" while the
partnership fund was the "hub" in the arrangement. Id.
17 Id. at 1371.
18 Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
9 Id.
120 Id.
121 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
122 Id. at 1354.
123 Id. at 1353-54. The practical utility of the process was to enable the local
phone company to choose which long-distance carrier's facilities over which to
route the call. Id.
124 Id. at 1357.
12 5 Id. at 1361.
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was merely a data field representing a preferred long-distance
carrier, it was a "useful, non-abstract result" that facilitated a
practical application and made the claimed process fall within the
scope of § 101.126
In summary, Alappat, State Street, and Excel show that the
proper test for whether any invention, regardless of type, falls
within the broad scope of § 101 is whether the invention as a
whole produces a useful, concrete, and tangible result. Such
results may be numbers or data provided that they represent non-
abstract entities related to a practical application. These principles
provide excellent guidance for determining patentability of signals,
the question that the Federal Circuit faced in Nuiften.
E. In re NuUten
The case in Nui/ten arose to the Federal Circuit as an appeal of
a decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("BPAI") to reject four claims in a patent application by Petrus
A.C.M. Nuijten as being directed toward unpatentable subject
matter under § 101.'27 The invention at issue was a technique for
reducing distortion in a desired signal caused by inserting digital
watermark information intended to protect against unauthorized
copying of the signal from a medium in which it is stored.'28
Nuijten claimed his invention in several different ways: as a
method for embedding supplemental data (i.e., the watermark) in a
signal, as an arrangement (i.e., system) for embedding the
supplemental data, as a computer-readable storage medium
containing a signal with embedded supplemental data, and finally
as:
126 Id. at 1358 (noting that the PlC "facilitates differential billing of long-
distance calls").
127 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh 'g en banc denied,
515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008). See generally Ex parte Nuijten, No. 2003-0853,
2006 WL 3939192, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1335 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2006) (non-
precedential). The BPAI is an administrative tribunal within the USPTO.
128 In re Nuyien, 500 F.3d at 1348. Nuijten's approach was directed to solve
the distortion problem associated with the particular way in which the desired
signal was encoded, known as "delta modulation." Id. at 1349.
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[Claim] 14. A signal with embedded supplemental data, the signal
being encoded in accordance with a given encoding process and
selected samples of the signal representing the supplemental data, and
at least one of the samples preceding the selected samples is different
from the sample corresponding to the given encoding process.129
The patent examiner rejected the latter two forms as non-statutory
subject matter under § 101.30 On appeal, the BPAI reversed the
examiner's rejection of the storage medium claim and held that the
claim was directed to an article of manufacture and thus within the
scope of § 101.'"' The panel, however, upheld the rejection of the
signal claim because the signal described had "no physical
attributes ... [and thus was] an 'abstract idea'" unpatentable under
Diehr, and because it did not fall into any of the four categories
enumerated in § 101.132
The Federal Circuit panel split into majority and dissenting
opinions after hearing the appeal of the BPAI's decision on the
signal claim. The majority opinion first analyzed the actual scope
of the signal claim. After concluding that the purpose of a signal is
to convey information, the majority stated that in order for a signal
to accomplish this purpose, it must have some physical form or
carrier, but the nature of the physical carrier is irrelevant to the
claims-"any form will do."' The majority went on to state that
even though a signal may have a physical carrier, it will not qualify
as patentable subject matter under § 101 if it is "transitory."' 3 4
Accordingly, radio waves, light pulses through an optical fiber, and
electrical pulses through a metal wire are all examples of transitory
signals-and as a result unpatentable-regardless of whether they
convey information.'
The Nuiten majority based this holding on an analysis of
whether signals fit within any of the four categories of inventions
enumerated in § 101.136 Easily dispensing with the other three
129 Ex parte Nuiten, 2006 WL 3939192, at *2, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336.
3 ln re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at 1351.
13' Id. at 1351-52.
132 Exparte Nuijten, 2006 WL 3939192, at *8, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337-39.
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categories, the court focused its analysis on whether a signal may
be considered a "manufacture.""' Relying on a definition from a
nineteenth-century dictionary,' the majority determined that
manufactures are limited to "tangible articles or commodities [and
that a] transient electric or electromagnetic transmission does not
fit within that definition." "9 According to the majority, a transitory
signal does not possess the tangibility needed to fall within one of
the enumerated categories of patentable subject matter under
§ 101, even if the signal is both physical and man-made.'40
Accordingly, the majority affirmed the BPAI's holding that the
claimed signal was unpatentable."
The Nuijten dissent, however, would have found that the claim
fit within the broad scope of § 101, which Congress intended to
"cover the full scope of technological ingenuity, however it might
best be claimed."'4 2 The -dissent argued that the claimed signal
constituted a "manufacture" if that term were interpreted in a
manner consistent with the expansive view of § 101 as done in
Chakrabarty rather than in an overly narrow manner as done by
the majority."' The dissent strongly objected to the majority's
introduction of the requirements that a manufacture be tangible and
non-transitory in order to be patentable under § 101.""' Instead, the
claimed signal should be patentable because it was created or
manipulated by human activity, had practical purpose or usefulness
" Id. at 1356 ("The question of whether the claimed signals are
'manufactures' is more difficult."). The court used "manufacture" and "article
of manufacture" interchangeably. Id. ("The term ['manufacture'] is used in the
statute in its noun form . . . and therefore refers to 'articles' resulting from the
process of manufacture.").
38 Id. (citing 1 CENTURY DICTIONARY 326 (William Dwight Whitney ed.,
1895)).
I39 Id.
140 Id. at 1356-57.
141 Id. at 1357.
142 Id. at 1362 (Linn, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 1363 (noting that Chakrabarty "leaves little room for the term





of conveying information,'45 and necessarily had a "physical
form." 46
III. ANALYSIS
Given the background provided in Part II, this section analyzes
the Federal Circuit's Nuiften decision in various ways. First, Part
III.A explores the majority's reasoning and how the holdings align
with existing Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent on
§ 101. Part III.B then critiques the majority opinion by analogy to
the Supreme Court's recent KSR decision interpreting § 103. Part
III.C discusses and compares the patentability of signals under
European law with the doctrine articulated in Nutten. Finally, Part
III.D explores some possible effects of Nuiften on the substantive
rights of inventors and important patent reform initiatives.
A. The Underlying Logic of the Nuijten Holdings
1. Construction of35 U.S.C. § 101
The majority and dissenting opinions in Nuiften differed
significantly in their interpretations of the scope of patentable
subject matter under § 101. The majority generally followed the
"narrow view" previously discussed,'47 asserting that a claimed
invention will fall outside of the scope of § 101 if it does not fit in
any of the four enumerated categories, regardless if the subject
matter is both new and useful.'4 8 This position has two critical
flaws. First, the majority cited no authority for this statement and,
more alarmingly, completely neglected to cite Chakrabarty in its
analysis of the scope of patentable subject matter under § 101.1'
As a result, the majority failed to justify its position that the
enumerated categories of inventions-process, machine,
manufacture, and composition of matter-set more appropriate
145 id.
146 Id. at 1353 (majority opinion).
147 See supra Part II.A.
148 In re Nuljten, 500 F.3d at 1354.
149 The majority cited Chakrabarty for two relatively minor points: for the
use of the same definition of "manufacture" as in an earlier case, and for its
definition of "composition of matter." Id. at 1356-57.
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bounds for patentable subject matter under § 101 than those set by
the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty, which were based on solid
evidence of Congress's intent.' Instead, the majority omitted this
step of the analysis and skipped directly to the task of categorizing
the invention." '
Second, the majority's position is inconsistent with the
principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Diehr-that the only
bar to patentability under § 101 is when the invention lacks
practical utility.15 2 In fact, the majority dealt with Diehr in much
the same way that it dealt with Chakrabarty-by neglecting to cite
the case in its analysis of the scope of patentable subject matter
under § 101.' As previously noted, the Federal Circuit has used
Diehr as a guidepost for developing its own interpretation of the
scope of § 101 in the face of rapid technological change, especially
in the area of digital computing and software.'5 4 Indeed, the
Federal Circuit's "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test
developed in Alappat, State Street, and Excel has its roots in
Diehr.'" But instead of applying Diehr's Federal Circuit progeny
in determining whether a signal fits within the broad scope of
§ 101, the Nutiten majority utilized a narrow approach in
determining the boundaries of one category of invention.
Consequently, the majority concluded that the "useful, concrete,
and tangible result" test did not even apply to this category."'
1s5 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that the
committee reports for the 1952 Patent Act indicated that Congress intended
§ 101 to "include anything under the sun that is made by man").
... See In re Nuiften, 500 F.3d at 1354-57; see also infra Part III.A.2.
152 See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (citing Diehr for this proposition).
'53 The majority cited Diehr in its summary of the procedural history, but only
as a source that was cited by the BPAI itself. In re Nuiften, 500 F.3d at 1352; Ex
parte Nuijten, No. 2003-0853, 2006 WL 3939192, at *8, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1335, 1337 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2006).
154 See Excel, 172 F.3d at 1356-57 (noting that "this court . .. has struggled to
make our understanding of the scope of § 101 responsive to the needs of the
modem world" and then citing Diehr after noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has
supported and enhanced this effort").
15 See supra Part II.D.
156 In re Nupten, 500 F.3d at 1357 n.7 ("We have never held that a
manufacture is ever required to produce any result. Thus, the 'useful, concrete,
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Such a narrow application was improper considering Congress's
intent for the patent laws to have a broad scope.'"
In contrast, the dissent in Nuijten took a properly expansive
view in its interpretation of § 101, relying extensively on both
Chakrabarty and Diehr.'" The dissent noted that the "new" and
"useful" requirements of § 101 formed the proper basis for
determining the scope of patentable subject matter.'5 9 An invention
is "new" if it is man-made rather than pre-existing in nature, and
the invention is "useful" if it has a practical application rather than
being merely an abstract principle. 60 According to the dissent, this
usefulness requirement is derived from the "useful Arts" language
of the Patent Clause and applies to technological skill or ingenuity
regardless of the form in which it is expressed.''
In summary, the failure to rely on the controlling Supreme
Court precedent interpreting the scope of § 101 called into question
the Nuiten majority's analysis of whether the claimed signal fell
within that scope. This analysis became more questionable when
the majority narrowly construed the practical utility requirement
that runs through Chakrabarty, Diehr, and their Federal Circuit
progeny.'62 As Judge Pauline Newman once stated:
The Board's historical practice of giving § 101 the narrowest possible
reading . . . is out of place in a world that has become totally dependent
on technology, and in which the laws governing technological
innovation have direct consequences for industrial growth.
Governmental timidity in the face of scientific and technologic change
is not only unnecessary: it is unsupportable. 6 1
and tangible result' inquiry is simply inapplicable here."). The majority appeared
to ignore the obvious interpretation that the manufacture itself was the result.
'57 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
158 The dissent cited Chakrabarty fifteen times and Diehr three times.
19 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1359.
160 See id. at 1364 ("To be 'made by man,' something must not be pre-existing
in nature; it must be, literally, an invention."); id. at 1365 ("[I]t is the application
rather than the principle itself that must be patented.").
161 Id. at 1361 n.3.
162 See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
163 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
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Although Judge Newman was referring to the USPTO's BPAI,
there is no reason why her statement is less applicable to
narrowness and timidity in decisions of the Federal Circuit-the
BPAI's reviewing court.
2. The New Patentability Requirements of "Non-Transitory" and
"Tangible"
While the Nui/ten majority failed to properly consider the full
scope of § 101, it did conduct considerable analysis on the
requirements for an invention to be considered patentable subject
matter under the § 101 category of "manufacture."" Both the
majority and dissent agreed that the signal at issue was man-
made.'6 5 Ultimately, however, the majority concluded that for an
invention to qualify as a "manufacture" it also had to be "tangible."
Since a signal is "transitory" it cannot meet this requirement and
thus is unpatentable.'66 There are several flaws in both this
analysis and the majority's ultimate conclusion.
First, the majority went to great lengths to narrowly define
what constitutes a "manufacture" under § 101. Using the same
nineteenth-century dictionary as the Supreme Court in
Chakrabarty,"' the majority defined "manufacture" in its verb
form as the production of "articles" from raw or prepared materials
by giving them new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations,
and defined "article" as "a particular substance or commodity."'
Based on these definitions, the majority concluded that a
"manufacture" as contemplated by § 101 must be a tangible article
or commodity.
164 See In re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at 1356-57.
165 Id. at 1356 (noting that signals were "man-made, in the sense of having
been encoded, generated, and transmitted by artificial means"); id. at 1368
(Linn, J., dissenting) ("The signal itself is man-made.").
'
6 6 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
1 In re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at 1356 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 308 (1980) (additional citations omitted)). The majority justified this
choice by noting that Congress had enacted the Patent Act of 1952 after the
same definition was used in the American Fruit case in which the Supreme
Court also interpreted § 101. Id. at 1356 n.5 (citing Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v.
Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)).
1 Id. at 1356.
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This conclusion suffers from several weaknesses. As an initial
matter, the wisdom of determining the patentability of an invention
in the rapidly changing field of information technology based on
definitions from a nineteenth-century dictionary is questionable. 69
Certainly this reliance on archaic definitions justifies Judge S. Jay
Plager's concern, expressed in Excel, that the Federal Circuit has
struggled to keep its interpretation of § 101 aligned with the needs
and realities of the modem world.'" Moreover, the majority's
reliance on such archaic definitions overly constrains the
boundaries on patentable subject matter under § 101. This approach
is inconsistent not only with the expansive scope articulated by the
Supreme Court in Chakrabarty and Diehr-which the majority did
not address"'-but also with Congress's intent when enacting the
Patent Act of 1790.172 This Act contemplated that there would be
manufactures that did not fit into any traditional category or mold
by providing that the patent applications for such inventions should
enable persons "skilled in the art .. . wherewith it may be nearest
connected" to make and use them."'
Furthermore, the majority's application of these definitions is
in conflict with O'Reilly, which was decided almost forty years
before the majority's dictionary of choice was published. In the
majority's view, the Supreme Court in O'Reilly did not find
Morse's invention of a "system of signs" patentable as a
manufacture but rather as a method for signaling; this claim thus
169 Although the Supreme Court cited this definition of "manufacture" in both
Chakrabarty and American Fruit, both cases involved the issue of whether
human modifications to a naturally occurring organism would qualify as either a
"manufacture" or "composition of matter." Thus, the issue in these cases related
to the requisite amount of change, not the tangibility of the manufacture itself
that was the issue in Nuiten. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 ("[T]he patentee
has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature."); Am. Fruit, 283 U.S. at 12 ("There is no change in the name,
appearance, or general character of the fruit.").
170 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
'' See supra Part III.A.1.
172 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1836).
'" In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
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was analogous to Nuijten's method claims that were allowed by
the USPTO.174 While purporting to base the distinction between a
"system of signs" and a method for signaling on the description in
Morse's application, the majority failed to address the
inconsistency between this position and its own requirement that a
process claim must contain one or more acts.'7 ' Thus, using
definitions from an archaic dictionary to draw the boundaries of
patentable subject matter is inconsistent with both policy and
precedent.
Second, the majority's conclusion that signals are not
"tangible" conflicts with its position that signals are "physical." 76
The plain meanings of the words "physical" and "tangible" do not
support the majority's logic that something physical must also be
non-transitory for it to be tangible."' "Physical" may be defined as
"having material existence; perceptible especially through the
senses and subject to the laws of nature.""' Likewise, "tangible" may
be defined as "capable of being perceived especially by the sense
of touch" or "substantially real."' 79 Both terms imply perceptibility
and materiality. It is difficult to see any distinction related to
duration of existence when looking at the words' plain meanings.
174 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc
denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also id. at 1369 n.8 (Linn, J.,
dissenting) (noting with apparent surprise that the O'Reilly court considered
Morse's claim an "art" rather than a "manufacture").
1' Id. at 1357. Morse's entire claim read as follows: "I claim, as my
invention, the system of signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and of dots, spaces,
and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, words, or sentences, substantially as
herein set forth and illustrated, for telegraphic purposes." O'Reilly v. Morse, 56
U.S. (15 How.) 62, 86 (1854). It is difficult to identify "an act or series of acts"
in this claim language.
176 This conclusion can be inferred from the majority's acceptance without
comment of both parties' stipulation of that point. See In re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at
1353 (noting that "Nuijten and the PTO agree that the claims include physical
but transitory forms of signal transmission").
17 The majority did not provide a dictionary definition of either term.
178 Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/
physical (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
"7 Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/
tangible (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).
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The majority also attempted to establish a link between a
signal's tangibility and its perceptibility while in a transitory form
during transmission.' The weakness of this argument was
apparent, however, when the majority cited propagation through a
vacuum as the only example of when a signal would be
imperceptible.'"' This concern about the inability to measure or
perceive a signal in a vacuum is misplaced. The patent laws of title
35 are applicable in the United States, and the Supreme Court has
shown a reluctance to extend their jurisdiction extraterritorially.'82
Consequently, the majority's assertion about the applicability of
§ 101 to the extraterrestrial jurisdiction of outer space is highly
speculative at best. Thus, the majority's distinction between
"physical" and "tangible" lacks a basis both in language and in
law. The fact that the majority went to such great lengths to draw
this narrow distinction is contrary to Chakrabarty's proscription
against courts reading into patent laws limitations not expressed by
Congress. "'
Finally, the majority's novel interpretation of tangibility and
the new requirement for permanence are in conflict with existing
Federal Circuit precedent. Both State Street and Excel dealt with
inventions that produced results that, while arguably abstract by
themselves, represented physical quantities or entities-the
numbers in State Street, a share price; the data field in Excel, a
long-distance operator. In both cases, the Federal Circuit found
80 In re Nuwten, 500 F.3d at 1356 ("Moreover, any tangibility arguably
attributed to a signal is embodied in the principle that it is perceptible-e.g.,
changes in electrical potential can be measured.").
81 Id. at 1357. The court defined "vacuum" as a medium that "is devoid of
matter," such as outer space. In what may be a first for a federal court, the
majority argued that the wave-particle duality theory of quantum mechanics did
not undermine its proposition. Id.
182 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1760 (2007)
("[I]n view of the expanded extraterritorial thrust AT&T's reading of [35
U.S.C.] § 271(f) entails, our precedent leads us to leave in Congress' court the
patent-protective determination AT&T seeks.").
83 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) ("We have also
cautioned that courts 'should not read into the patent laws limitations and
conditions which the legislature has not expressed.'" (quoting United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933))).
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that the results were "useful, concrete, and tangible" because they
had a practical utility.'8 4 The signal itself was the result in
Nuijten's claim, and the majority clearly recognized its practical
utility.'"8  To the extent that the signal represented a physical
quantity like audio, the reasoning of State Street and Excel
suggests that § 101 should not bar its patentability.'8 6
Likewise, the majority's holding that "transitory embodiments
are not directed to statutory subject matter"' is contrary to the
decision in State Street. In that case, the Federal Circuit
considered the numerical result of the claimed computer system
and stated that the fact that the number was only "momentarily
fixed" did not prevent it from being a "useful, concrete, and
tangible result" under the Alappat test.'8 There are no principled
reasons to find that signals conveyed by a physical carrier are more
transitory than financial results calculated by a computer that may
overwrite or erase them within microseconds during the execution
of the next software instruction.
In summary, there are a number of flaws in the Nuilten
majority's determination of whether a signal is a "manufacture,"
including the method used to define the term itself, the novel and
inconsistent requirements of tangibility and permanence, and the
inconsistency with existing Federal Circuit precedent, including
A lappat, State Street, and Excel. All of these flaws appear to result
from an overly narrow or restrictive view of the patent laws, a
view against which the Supreme Court has routinely counseled. 8 9
184 See supra Part II.D.
' In re Nupten, 500 F.3d at 1348-51 (describing in great detail the invention
itself along with its practical application and advantages).
186 The majority explicitly rejected the application of the "useful, concrete,
and tangible result" test. Id. at 1357 n.7.
1 Id. at 1353.
188 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
189 See Chakrabarty, 447 F.3d at 308; see also infra Part 1I.B (discussing
analogous guidance from the Supreme Court for the interpretation of § 103).
[VOL. 9: 243272
Patentability of Signals
3. Elevating Form over Substance
As discussed earlier, the inventor in Nuiten claimed the signal-
related invention in four different forms.'" Although the patent
examiner rejected claims to the computer-readable medium and the
signal itself, the examiner allowed the claims directed towards the
method and system for generating the signal. 9 ' If one assumes that
the system claims were properly allowed-and there is no
evidence of a contrary view within the Nuijten court-then it
follows that the claimed system must produce a "useful, concrete,
and tangible result" in order to pass the test for patentable subject
matter articulated in Alappat and State Street.'92 Since the signal
encoded with the supplemental data was the system's result, then
the signal must be "useful, concrete, and tangible." Likewise,
assuming on the same basis that the method claims were properly
allowed, then it follows that the method also must produce a
"useful, concrete, and tangible result" in order to pass the § 101
patentability test articulated in Excel. Since the method produces
the same encoded signal result as the system, the same conclusion
that the signal is "useful, concrete, and tangible" directly follows.
If the result or product of a method or process claim puts that claim
within the scope of patentable subject matter, the same result
claimed in "product-by-process" form likewise should be within
the scope of § 101.'" This brief analysis points out a glaring
inconsistency in the majority's characterization of signals-that
signals are sufficiently tangible to be patentable subject matter
when they are claimed in some ways but not in others.
This conclusion is further supported by the procedural history
of the signal-bearing, computer-readable medium claim in Nuuten,
190 The forms included a method for generating the signal embedded with
supplemental data, a system for generating the signal, a computer-readable
medium containing the signal, and the signal itself In re Nuiften, 500 F.3d at
1351.
'91 Id. The majority also noted that these claims were not part of the case on
appeal.
192 Recall that the purpose of the digital computer in Alappat was to produce a
waveform or signal for display, representing a property measured by a
laboratory instrument. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
193 Cf MPEP, supra note 92, § 2113 (noting that courts have rejected product-
by-process claims under §§ 102 and 103).
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which was initially rejected by the examiner as unpatentable
subject matter under § 101.194 On appeal, the BPAI reversed the
rejection, finding that the stored signal was "functional" because a
digital computer could use it to produce a "useful result."'9 5 Like
the method and system claims, this claim was not before the
Federal Circuit on appeal but the majority noted its existence and
allowance.'9 6 The BPAI based this reversal primarily on In re
Lowry,' 7 in which the Federal Circuit set guidelines for the
patentability of computer-readable media containing particular data
structures.'98 The Lowry court noted that the data structures at
issue were "physical entities" whose functionality derived from
their ability to increase the efficiency of a computer that uses
them.'" Given the unclear distinction between the meanings of
"physical" and "tangible,"200 it is reasonable to conclude that the
data structures in Lowry also would be considered "tangible."2 0' If
so, then the encoded data signal stored on the computer-readable
medium that was claimed by Nuijten also must be considered
tangible. If the stored signal's usefulness is a result of its
functionality, then the analysis of the computer-readable medium
claim leads to the same conclusion that signals are sufficiently
tangible to be patentable when they are claimed in some ways but
not in others.
As this case demonstrates, claims can be drafted in many
different forms to cover essentially the same invention. Yet
determination of patentability should not be based on the form of
194 Exparte Nuijten, No. 2003-0853, 2006 WL 3939192, at *5, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1335, 1339 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 24, 2006) (holding that "an electrical signal
per se does not fit within any of the statutory categories of 35 U.S.C. § 101").
195 Id.
196 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh'g en banc
denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
197 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1583-84.
'
9 9 Id. at 1584.
200 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
201 See supra Part III.A.2; see also In re Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1584 (noting that
the data structures provided "tangible benefits").
274 [VOL. 9: 243
Patentability of Signals
the claim or on the skill of the claim drafter,202 but rather on the
ingenuity of the inventor and the usefulness of the invention. By
elevating form over substance, the Nuijten majority's logic
produces precisely the opposite of this desirable result. In his
dissent, Judge Richard Linn expressed one practical effect of this
inconsistent doctrine:
The signal is either a "new and useful" manufacture or it is not. It is
incongruous to treat an individual watching a movie containing the
signal . . . in real time as any less of an infringer than someone
watching the same movie after a short delay using the recording feature
of, for example, a TiVo digital video recorder. A better distinction is
made based on the nature of the underlying invention, without regard to
the particular way it is claimed.203
In summary, the practical effect of Nuilten is that inventors who
create new and useful signals are forced to protect those signals
with a diverse set of claims rather than directly claiming the "real
underlying invention."204
B. Missed "Signals "from KSR
Even though the Supreme Court's and the Federal Circuit's
constructions of other patent statutes are not controlling on the
interpretation of § 101, it is relevant to examine these statutes and
their judicial constructions for the purpose of information or
analogy. In KSR, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of a case
from the Federal Circuit involving the application of the standard
for determining obviousness under § 103.205 The case involved an
invention that combined an electronic sensor with a mechanical
202 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Linn, J., dissenting)
("Patentability does not depend on which form the claim takes."), reh'g en banc
denied, 515 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593
(1978) (criticizing the practice of "mak[ing] the determination of patentable
subject matter depend simply on the draft[s]man's art").
203 In re Nuiten, 500 F.3d at 1362 (Linn, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1366.
205 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734-35 (2007). Section
103 provides a bar to patentability when "the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
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automobile accelerator pedal-both devices known in the prior
art-in a particular manner that prevented the sensor wires from
becoming worn with use.206 The district court applied the obviousness
test articulated by the Supreme Court in Graham2 07 and found the
patent invalid under § 103 because it would have been obvious to
someone of ordinary skill in pedal design to combine the particular
mechanical pedal with an electronic sensor, such as a sensor for a
different pedal type that was described in another patent.20 8
On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's invalidity decision because the lower court failed to apply
the Federal Circuit's "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" ("TSM")
test to identify a particular "principle or understanding . . . that
would have motivated one with no knowledge of the invention" to
combine the pedal and sensor in that particular way.209 Rather than
considering broad motivating factors such as the state of the art in
the relevant industry, as the district court did, the Federal Circuit
required that the motivation come from references that address the
"precise problem that the patentee was trying to solve."210 The
court distinguished the problem solved by the prior art pedal from
the particular one at issue in the case. 2 '
On appeal, the Supreme Court in KSR identified and criticized
a number of flaws in the Federal Circuit's interpretation of
206 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735-36.
207 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
The Court articulated the following test:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue
are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. Against this background the obviousness or nonobviousness
of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as
commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others,
etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
Id.
208 See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1735-38.
209 Id. at 1738-39 (emphasis added).
210 Id. at 1738 (citing Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 288
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
211 id.
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§ 103.212 These flaws are strikingly similar to those identified in
the Nuilten majority's interpretation of § 101. The Court began its
analysis by rejecting the rigidity of the Federal Circuit's TSM test
and affirming the "expansive and flexible approach" established in
Graham and earlier cases relating to obviousness.2 13 Moreover, the
Court identified the source of the flaw in the TSM test as the
Federal Circuit's "narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry"
under § 103 that was set forth in Graham.2 14 As discussed above,
the interpretation of § 101 by the Nuijten majority suffers from a
similar flaw.2 5 In particular, the majority's narrow approach to
patentable subject matter is in conflict with the broad principles of
Chakrabarty and Diehr in a manner closely analogous to how the
Federal Circuit's TSM test conflicted with the interpretation of
§ 103 that the Supreme Court articulated in Graham and
reaffirmed in KSR.
The Court also sharply criticized the Federal Circuit's
formalistic approach to determining obviousness under § 103,
noting that the § 103 obviousness analysis prescribed by Graham
"cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words
teaching, suggestion, and motivation."2 16 Moreover, the Court held
that the application of TSM as a "rigid and mandatory formula[]"
was incompatible with Supreme Court precedents such as Graham
because "[t]he diversity of inventive pursuits and of modem
technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this way.""
These incompatibilities are analogous to those found in the Nuijten
majority opinion-in particular the rigid use of the enumerated
categories and definition of "manufacture," and the resulting
formalistic rules that force inventors to claim useful, man-made
signals indirectly by repetitive claims to systems, devices, or
212 Id at 1738-41.
213 Id. at 1739.
214 Id. at 1741.
215 See supra Part III.A. 1.
216 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
217 Id., cf eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006)
(noting that the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals "erred in its categorical grant
of [injunctive] relief' in favor of a patent holder against a party found to infringe
the patent).
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methods that produce the signals.218 Accordingly, the formalistic
approach of Nuiten conflicts with Chakrabarty and Diehr in the
same manner that the Federal Circuit's TSM test was found to be
in conflict with Graham.
Although the above analysis focuses on similarities for the
purpose of analogy, it is relevant to consider to what extent these
analogies with KSR and § 103 can be used as guiding rather than
controlling principles for lower courts interpreting the scope of
§ 101. Nothing in KSR directly suggests the application of the
Court's holdings in that case to § 101. Nevertheless, §§ 101, 102,
and 103 are part of a unified determination of patentability; they
are a series of doors that an inventor must unlock in order to obtain
a patent. 2 19 Prior to 1952, the non-obviousness requirement for
patentability was a federal common-law doctrine derived from the
text of § 101.220 Specifically, the courts found that the "whoever
invents" language of § 101 implied a requirement for patentability
that could not be satisfied by an "invention" that was novel under
§ 102 yet too similar to prior art such as existing inventions. 22' The
Patent Act of 1952 created the statutory non-obviousness requirement
of § 103 by codifying this earlier common-law doctrine.222 The
history of that legislation also indicates, however, that Congress
intended the scope of § 101 to cover "anything under the sun that
is made by man." 2 3 This common legislative history is evidence
that in codifying the existing common-law doctrine of
obviousness, Congress intended to protect new and useful
inventions falling within this extremely broad scope of patentable
subject matter.
The existence of a link between §§ 101 and 103 also is
supported by the purposes of the patent statutes. According to the
218 See supra Parts III.A.2 and III.A.3.
219 See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated as moot sub
nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (mem.).
220 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966) (citing
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ll How.) 248, 267 (1851)).
221 In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 961-62.
222 Graham, 383 U.S. at 3-4.
223 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No.
82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
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Supreme Court, promoting "real innovation" is a principal
motivation for granting patents. 224 The expansive interpretation of
§ 101 articulated by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty and Diehr
encourages and rewards real innovation in areas such as
biotechnology and digital communications. 225  According to the
Court in KSR, however, awarding patents for "advances that would
occur in the ordinary course" would hinder innovation and may
ultimately diminish the value and utility of previously patented
inventions.22 6 Consequently, the expansive interpretation of § 103
articulated in Graham and KSR serves to protect real innovation
encouraged by § 101 by prohibiting the grant of patents on mere
"predictable uses of prior art elements according to their
established functions."22 7
In summary, the common purpose and intertwined legislative
history of §§ 101 and 103 provide a rationale for using controlling
precedent to interpret one of these sections as an informative
resource when construing the other. As such, the interpretation of
§ 103 offered by the Supreme Court in KSR is informative to lower
courts interpreting the scope of § 101.228 Courts that fail to consider
the guidance of KSR while interpreting § 101, such as the Federal
Circuit majority in Nuilten, risk upsetting the intended balance
between these statutes that can be inferred from the legislative
history of the Patent Act of 1952.
224 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
225 See supra Part II.A; see also Erik S. Maurer, Notes and Comments, An
Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1057, 1090-91 (2001) (making an economic argument for a
broad scope of patentable subject matter because market forces ensure that
"truly valued innovations will be consumed at any price" while "undemanded
[sic] patents and their owners suffer the market consequences of natural
selection, while society still gains from their teachings and the wealth generation
inherent in accumulating knowledge").
2 26 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
227 Id. at 1740.
228 See In re Nuijten, 515 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Linn, Newman, &
Rader, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]his case raises important questions about the
relationship between § 101 and § 103.").
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C. Lessons from Europe
While the granting of U.S. patents is governed by the
Constitution, statutes, and rules of this country, it is relevant to
consider how other regional or national patent offices deal with the
patentability of signals. This consideration is particularly relevant
given the increasing rate at which inventors are filing patent
applications outside of their home countries or regions.2 29  The
patentability of signals under European law is considered here for
comparison in view of the prevalence of European non-residents,
including U.S. residents, who file European patent applications.23 0
Another motivation for consideration of signal patentability in
Europe is that the doctrine appears to be well-developed compared
to other jurisdictions, as discussed below.
The European Patent Convention ("EPC") provides that a
patent application may claim inventions in the enumerated
categories of "product, process, apparatus, or use."23 1  The
European Patent Office ("EPO") has roughly categorized these
four categories as being divided between physical entities (i.e.,
product and apparatus) and activities (i.e., process and use).232
Furthermore, EPO rules define a "product" expansively as
including, but not limited to, "a substance or compositions (e.g.
chemical compound or a mixture of compounds) as well as any
physical entity (e.g. object, article, apparatus, machine, or system
229 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., WIPO PATENT REPORT: STATISTICS
ON WORLDWIDE PATENT ACTIVITY § C.4 (2007 ed.), available at http://www.
wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/patent report 2007.html (noting that 47%
and 51% of the patent applications filed in the USPTO and EPO, respectively,
were filed by non-residents).
230 See id § C.2 (showing that in 2005, the European Patent Office had the
third-highest number of patent applications filed by non-residents, behind the
USPTO and the Chinese patent office); id. § C.3 (showing that in 2005, U.S.
residents filed more patent applications abroad than residents of any other
country).
231 European Patent Convention, Rule 43(2) (13th ed., July 2007), available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/epc.html (click "Download PDF version"
hyperlink). Note that the "product" category is analogous to the category of
"manufacture" enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
232 EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION, § C-III 3.1
(Dec. 2007), available at http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/guicx/
e/c iii 3 1.htm.
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of co-operating apparatus) which is produced by a person 's
technical skill."233
The EPO's Board of Appeal ("the Board") is responsible for
making case-by-case determinations of what falls within this
expansive definition of "product." 23 4 The Board first considered
the patentability of signals in BBC/Colour Television Signal
TJ 63/85,235 in which the applicant claimed a "television signal
adapted to generate a picture."2 36  The Board reversed the
examiner's rejection of the claim as unpatentable subject matter,
stating, "The T.V. signal as claimed would [not be subject to
certain exclusions] because it is a physical reality which can
directly be detected by technological means and, therefore, cannot
be considered as an abstract entity, despite its transient
character."2 37 In addition, the Board stated that the signal "inherently
comprises the technical features of the television system in which
it is being used." 238 Thus, the Board recognized that a signal is
useful as the key ingredient of a television system, is concrete
because it is non-abstract, and is tangible because it is a physical
reality.
The Board's subsequent opinions have affirmed this holding.
In PHILIPS/Record Carrier T1194/97,239 the Board considered a
claim for a "record carrier" for use in a picture retrieval system.240
While reversing the examiner's rejection of the claim as
unpatentable subject matter, the Board stated that "no distinction
regarding patentability should be made between the claim
categories of a signal and a record carrier. "241 Furthermore, the
233 Id. (emphasis added).
234 European Patent Convention, supra note 231, art. 21 l ("The Boards of
Appeal shall be responsible for the examination of appeals from decisions of the
Receiving Section, the Examining Divisions and Opposition Divisions, and the
Legal Division.").
235 [1990] E.P.O.R. 599.
236 Id. at 601.
237 Id. at 603.
238 Id.
239 [2001] E.P.O.R. 25.
240 Id. at 195. This type of claim is analogous to the "computer-readable
medium" type of claim allowed by the USPTO. See supra Part II.E.
241 PHILIPS, [2001] E.P.O.R. at 198.
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Board recognized that the information structure contained in a signal
"represented a functional, technical feature."242 Accordingly, the
EPO recognizes that a signal's patentability derives-at least in
part-from its underlying information structure that is a product of
an inventor's technical skill and serves a useful function or
purpose.243 This view is much more consistent with the dominant
Federal Circuit doctrine of patentable subject matter expressed in
Alappat, State Street, and Excel than the narrow view articulated
by the majority in Nuijten.244
One of the main purposes of the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") is to "reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade, [while] taking into account the
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights."245 In particular, TRIPS article 27(1) states that
"patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application." 246 TRIPS has been incorporated into the EPC24 7 and
the EPO appears to be interpreting "product" as having an
expansive scope extending into "all fields of technology,"
including those where signals have important and useful
purposes.2 48
242 Id.
243 Id. (citing BBC and noting that in that case, "the Board did grant a carrier
characterised by a representation of information because its content had a
technical function in the TV receiver" (emphasis added)).
244 See supra Part II.D.
245 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Preamble, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS], available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legale/27-trips.pdf. The importance of this
purpose is evident from the empirical evidence showing substantial numbers of
patent applications being filed by foreign nationals. See supra note 229 and
accompanying text.
246 TRIPS, supra note 245, art. 27 1 1.
247 See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 231, art. 87 T 1(b)
(noting that any person who has filed a patent application in a WTO-member
country may use that filing as a priority date in the EPO).
248 In IBM/Computer Program T935/97, [1999] E.P.O.R. 301, the Board
addressed the question of how the EPC should be interpreted for patentability of
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In 1994, Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act in order to implement a number of trade-related provisions,
including TRIPS. 249 Although the Act amended several sections of
title 35,250 § 101 was not among them and the Act did not otherwise
address any potential effects of TRIPS on the scope of patentable
subject matter. While testifying before a congressional subcommittee,
however, USPTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman noted that under
TRIPS, "[p]roduct patents will be available for pharmaceuticals
and agricultural chemicals in all WTO countries, as well as for all
other fields of technology, subject to a short list of permissible
exclusions."2 5 1 Since the USPTO is the agency responsible for
administering the TRIPS-related changes to the patent laws, it is
reasonable to infer that Congress gave weight to Lehman's
interpretation. If after hearing his testimony, Congress did not see
the need to amend § 101 when enacting legislation implementing
TRIPS, then it is also reasonable to infer that Congress believed
that § 101 already complied with TRIPS requirements.252 If so,
then this is evidence that Congress intended the § 101 category of
"manufacture" to be interpreted consistent with the analogous
TRIPS category of "product," such that patentability is non-
computer programs in light of TRIPS. The Board first noted that the EPO had
expressed a clear desire to apply the EPC in conformity with TRIPS. Id. at 306.
Citing BBC, the Board further stated that computer programs should be treated
in the same manner as signals, thereby implying that the EPO treated
patentability of signals in a manner consistent with TRIPS. Id.
249 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809,
§§ 501-534 (1994).
250 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (amended in 1995 to comply with
the twenty-year patent term requirement of TRIPS).
251 GA7 and Intellectual Property: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and
Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks)
(emphasis added). The noted exclusions relate to "diagnostic, therapeutic and
surgical methods" and "plants and animals other than micro-organisms."
TRIPS, supra note 245, art. 27 3.
252 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 115(2) (1987) ("A
provision of a treaty of the United States that becomes effective as law of the
United States supersedes as domestic law any inconsistent preexisting provision
of a law or treaty of the United States.").
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discriminatory with respect to the field of technology. In failing to
construe the language of § 101 in this manner, the Federal Circuit
has created unnecessary impediments for inventors who wish to
obtain patent protection in both the United States and Europe-a
result directly contrary to the intent of TRIPS.
D. Implications ofNuijten for Patent Policy and Practice
While the discussion thus far has focused on the legal doctrine
for patentability of signals, it also is important to understand the
practical motivations for signal claims and the practical
implications of their prohibition under Nuiten. Furthermore, this
prohibition may come in conflict with the policy goals of the
ongoing congressional and administrative reforms of the patent
system. Since signal claims may be useful as a means to protect
any invention involving communication of information,2 53 these
implications and effects are potentially very broad. For instance,
signal claims may be effective in asserting that a patent should be
included in a patent licensing pool.254 These pools often are used to
license patents essential for industry standards related to audio,
video, and communications technologies.2 55 These types of standards
are becoming increasingly important to the modern economy. 256
253 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 998.
254 Id. at 999.
255 See id. at 999-1000. For examples of such pools, see Introduction to
MPEG-LA's AVC Patent Portfolio License, http://www.mpegla.com/avc (last
visited Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology) (describing patent pool for H.264 Advanced Video Codec
("AVC") standard); Introduction to MPEG-LA's ATSC Patent Portfolio
License, http://www.mpegla.com/atsc (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (on file with the
North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (describing patent pool for
Advanced Television Standards Committee ("ATSC") high-definition television
signal standard); and Overview of MPEG-2 AAC Standard Licensing Program,
http://www.vialicensing.com/Licensing/MPEG2AACindex.cfm (last visited
Feb. 3, 2008) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology)
(describing patent pool for MPEG-2 Advanced Audio Codec ("AAC")
standard).
256 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
33 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/index.shtm#2007 (noting that
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Relative to other types of claims, signal claims have
advantages in terms of protecting the patent holder's rights against
a broader range of infringers. 257 For instance, claiming the invention
as a signal rather than as a computer-readable medium bearing the
signal may account for the additional situations where the
infringing signal is never stored (e.g., broadcast) and where the
infringing signal is produced outside the United States.258 One
possible example of this scenario is an Internet radio broadcast
from Canada that is received in the United States. Relative to a
medium claim, a signal claim also has the advantage of being
directly infringed by both entities when one transmits the signal
and another records it to a medium. 259 For example, this situation
would occur when a telecommunications or Internet service
provider ("ISP") carried the infringing signal on its network to an
end user who recorded it on the hard drive of his or her laptop
computer or media player. 260 By using a signal claim, the inventor
has a greater chance of being successful in an infringement suit
against the service provider, which may be the only economically
feasible claim. 261
For a similar reason, a signal claim may be more effective than
a claim for the method of encoding the signal. If such a method is
implemented in software, the entity providing the software would
not directly infringe the method claim but may be liable for active
inducement or contributory infringement only if direct
infringement by the user can be proven.26 2 Even if suing the user
"[i]ndustry standards are widely acknowledged to be one of the engines of the
modem economy").
257 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 991.
258 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass'n in Support of
Neither Party at 14, In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 2006-
1371).
259 id.
260 See Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 999 ("Telecommunications companies
and internet service providers face a high risk of infringement liability.").
261 Id.
262 See Joy Tech., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770, 773-74 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(noting that a method or process claim is directly infringed only when the
process is performed, but that a supplier of goods that perform the claimed
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for direct infringement is a rational choice, the patent holder faces
a higher burden of proof for the claims against the software
supplier,263 who may be a competitor and thus the desired target of
the suit. Claiming the method as a signal gets around these
difficulties.2 64
Signal claims also may have the advantage of significantly
reducing the number of claims needed to cover all anticipated
infringing uses of the invention. This point is best illustrated by
considering the different types of claims that an inventor may need
to use without the benefit of a signal claim. First, the inventor
must claim the invention as a system for encoding the signal to
cover infringement by a supplier of a signal transmitter. Similarly,
the inventor also must claim the invention as a system for decoding
the signal to cover infringement by a supplier of a signal receiver.
In order to cover infringement by a company that supplies software
that encodes and/or decodes the signal, the inventor must claim the
invention as a method for encoding and/or decoding the signal.
Finally, the inventor must claim the invention in the computer-
readable medium format to cover infringement by those who
would attempt to store the signal on a hard drive, such as an online
music service or a supplier of DVDs. Even with these four
different claims, the inventor still may not be able to cover all of
the potential infringers, such as the hypothetical ISP discussed
above. The one thing that all of these potential infringers have in
common is that they all use the signal itself in some manner. By
using one or more properly drafted signal claims,265 the inventor
process may be liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)-(c), provided that direct
infringement can be shown to exist).
263 See 5 CHISUM, supra note 67, §§ 17.03-.04 (discussing the need to prove
knowledge and/or intent in order to prevail on claims under § 271(b)-(c)).
264 See Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 999.
265 Multiple signal claims may be needed for at least two reasons. First, any
signal likely will need to be claimed as one independent claim along with
several other claims depending on it, similar to most other types of inventions.
Second, the signal may need to be claimed in both structural and functional
formats, as described in Part II.C supra. See also Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2,
at 999 (noting that signal claims may be drafted in both structural and functional
formats).
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can cover the entire range of uses of the signal, which lies at the
core of his or her invention.
Thus, by discarding function in favor of formalism, the Federal
Circuit effectively has increased the number of claims required to
cover an invention relating to a signal. This increase has implications
for inventions in a broad range of multimedia and communications
technologies. 26 6  At a minimum, it will increase the cost for
inventors to obtain patents for their inventions since the USPTO
assesses a per-claim surcharge for patent applications when the
number of claims exceeds certain thresholds.26 7 In addition, the
need for more claims is likely to increase the complexity of the
preparation and prosecution of the patent application, which may
result in higher attorney's fees for the inventor.26 8 An increase in
prosecution complexity also implies an increase in complexity of
the USPTO examination of the application, possibly leading to
longer delays between the filing of the application and the granting
of the patent.269
When viewed together with other recent developments,
however, the Federal Circuit's formalistic claim requirements also
may impact the substantive property rights of inventors. During
the last five years, reform of the patent system has emerged as a
high-profile policy initiative of both the legislative and executive
branches. The House of Representatives passed the Patent Reform
Act of 2007 in September 2007, while the Senate currently is
266 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 2, at 998 (noting that signal claims are "useful
for any invention that involves the communication of information").
267 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(i)-(j) (2007).
268 Cf AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, AIPLA REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2007 1-78, 1-79 (July 2007) (noting that the median cost for a utility
patent application prepared by a law firm of seventy-six or more attorneys
increases from $8,000 for an invention of ten claims or less to $14,500 for a
"relatively complex electrical/computer" invention).
269 Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of
Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,720-21 (Aug. 21, 2007)
[hereinafter Proposed USPTO Rules] ("A number of patent applications contain
a large number of claims, which makes efficient and effective examination of
such applications problematic.").
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considering its own Patent Reform Act.270 The two bills contain
many of the same provisions but differ in some respects.2 7'
Nevertheless, if the bills are harmonized and signed into law by the
President, the result arguably will be the most sweeping reforms to
the U.S. patent system since the nineteenth century.272 These reforms
include a number of provisions intended to reduce the number of
poor-quality patents, which Congress views as a hindrance to
future innovation.2 73
Meanwhile, the USPTO has taken its own initiative to improve
the quality of issued patents. One of the factors identified by the
USPTO as impacting patent quality is the inadequate amount of
time that examiners are allotted for each application. 2 74 The USPTO
has found that applications containing a large number of claims
absorb an inordinate amount of patent examination resources,27 5
and thus play a role in diminishing the quality of issued patents.
Initially, the USPTO proposed rules that would limit the number of
claims per application to ten or less, but later, in response to public
comments, relaxed that limit to five independent claims and
twenty-five total claims per application. 276  The inventor may
exceed this limit, however, if he or she provides additional
information in the form of an examination support document
("ESD").277 This exception to the limit has been met with strong
270 See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 1 10th Cong. (as passed by
House, Sept. 10, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (as
reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 19, 2007).
271 For a table comparing the two bills, see JOHN R. THOMAS & WENDY H.
SCHACHT, PATENT REFORM IN THE 110TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUEs 14
(Cong. Res. Serv., Jan. 10, 2008).
272 Id. at Summary.
273 H.R. REP. No. 110-314, at 20 (2007).
274 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 51 (2004) ("One reason for suspecting that quality has
suffered is that . . . the number of patent examiners in recent years has not kept
pace with the increase in workload represented not only by the enormous growth
in the number of applications . .. but also by the growing complexity of
applications as represented by the growth in the number of claims and prior art
citations per application.").





criticism from many commentators due to its potential negative
impact on both the cost of obtaining a patent and the enforceability
of a patent obtained using an ESD. 278  The USPTO also has
proposed new rules limiting the number of continuation and
divisional applications that can be derived from a "parent"
application. 279  When combined with the per-application claim
limit, the effect is to limit the total number of claims available for
an applicant to use in establishing the rights to his or her invention.
Both large companies and individuals have recognized the
potential impact of these rules and have challenged them in
court.280
278 The ESD requires the applicant to identify the closest prior art and
distinguish the invention from that art. Id. Some practitioners believe this
effectively requires the applicant to examine his or her own invention, thereby
creating potential defenses to be used against the applicant if he or she tries to
assert the granted patent in the future against alleged infringers. See Patently-O
Patent Law Blog, USPTO Guidelines for Examination Support Documents
(ESD) (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2007/09/uspto-
guideline.html (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
Of particular concern is the defense of inequitable conduct, which the Federal
Circuit has expanded recently. See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge
Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct for
failing to disclose to the USPTO a reference cited by the same examiner in
another patent application by the same applicant). But cf H.R. REP. No. 110-
314, at 42-43 (Sept. 4, 2007) (proposing to codify the law of inequitable
conduct in order to increase certainty for this defense). Additionally, some
authorities have estimated that filing an ESD will substantially increase the
overall cost of a patent application. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST
ESTIMATE OF S. 1145 PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007 10 (2008) (estimating an
added cost between $5,000 and $10,000 per application for required "search
reports, analysis, and other information"); Leon Radomsky & Andrew S.
Baluch, Provision of Reform Bill Will Triple Cost of Patents, IP LAw360, Feb.
20, 2008 (estimating a cost between $14,250 and $23,500 per EDS). In
summary, it is likely that the cost and uncertainty of the new ESD requirement
will provide a strong disincentive toward exceeding the claim limits imposed in
the new rules.
279 Proposed USPTO Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 46,718-20.
280 See Tafas v. Dudas, Nos. 1:07cv846(JCC) & 1:07cvl008(JCC), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26086, at *34-35 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1, 2008) (granting a permanent
injunction prohibiting the USPTO from enacting the proposed rules in a case
consolidated from separate suits filed by individual Tafas and pharmaceutical
company GlaxoSmithKline). The basis for the court's decision in Tafas was
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Consequently, the combination of the new USPTO rules and
the Federal Circuit's holding in Nuiten places the inventor of a
new and useful signal between the horns of a dilemma. On one
hand, the inventor may choose to forego claiming his or her
invention in certain forms or embodiments, thereby reducing or
eliminating the right to exclude use of the signal-the core of the
invention-by certain entities. On the other hand, the inventor can
try to maximize his or her right to exclude by claiming the signal
in many different forms. In doing so, however, the inventor likely
will need to follow the expensive, untested exception path to the
new USPTO rules, which may be littered with defenses against
claims of infringement.28 ' Also, by choosing this second path, the
inventor's application requires more USPTO examination
resources, which negatively impacts a key factor in overall patent
quality.28 2 Thus, the Nuiten majority's formalistic and narrow
approach to patentable subject matter under § 101 ultimately may
frustrate the USPTO's policy initiatives to improve patent quality.
On the contrary, the dissent's functional and expansive approach
toward defining the scope of § 101 for signals provides inventors
better means to protect their inventions and is aligned with the
USPTO's initiatives to improve patent quality.
IV. CONCLUSION
More than 150 years after the Supreme Court in O'Reilly
decided that Samuel Morse's man-made telegraph signals were
patentable under U.S. law, the Federal Circuit in Nuiten
considered the patentability of man-made signals used in the
modern application of digital content protection. In contrast to the
Court in O'Reilly, however, the majority in Nuiften narrowly
construed § 101 and broadly held that signals are per se
unpatentable because they do not fall into any of the four
that the USPTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority, id at *34, but the patent
reform legislation passed by the House would expressly overrule this holding if
enacted, see Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (as passed by
House, Sept. 10, 2007) (granting substantive rulemaking authority to the
USPTO).
281 See supra note 278 (discussing the implications of the ESD).
282 Proposed USPTO Rules, 72 Fed. Reg. at 47,621.
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categories of inventions enumerated in § 101. Rather than being
based on the expansive view of patentability articulated by the
Supreme Court in Chakrabarty and Diehr, this holding was based
on artificial, overly narrow, and self-contradictory distinctions that
have little basis in language, law, or policy. Moreover, this
holding failed to take into consideration the Supreme Court's
recent guidance in KSR on the interpretation of § 103, which is
relevant and informative to the interpretation of § 101 due to the
links between the two statutes based on common legislative history
and complementary purposes.
The Nupten decision on the patentability of signals is likely to
have several other implications for patent policy and practice.
First, the narrow approach of the Nupten majority requiring signals
to be claimed in multiple indirect forms is in direct conflict with
the EPO's liberal approach permitting signals to be claimed directly.
This conflict creates additional costs and other unnecessary
impediments for an inventor trying to obtain patents for his or her
invention in both the United States and Europe. Such impediments
are contrary to the intent of the TRIPS agreement. Second, the
Nuqten majority's narrow interpretation of the § 101 category of
"manufacture" conflicts with the broader meaning of the analogous
TRIPS category of "product." Congress's intent for "manufacture"
to be interpreted in the same broad manner arguably may be
inferred from the lack of any changes it made to § 101 in the
implementation of TRIPS, even with full knowledge of the TRIPS
terminology and its meaning. If so, the narrow definition of
"manufacture" that excludes from patentability a useful, man-made
signal is in opposition with Congress's intent. Finally, when
coupled with new USPTO initiatives to improve patent quality by
limiting the number of claims per patent application, NuUten's
formalistic requirements for claiming signal-related inventions
may place inventors between the horns of a dilemma. The inventor
may be forced to choose between foregoing protection of his or her
invention against all possible infringing uses and choosing an
expensive, untested exception path to obtaining a patent that may
yield an apparently broad property right that is ultimately illusory
when the inventor tries to enforce it. Moreover, achieving the
broadest possible property right by using this second path may
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conflict with the important objective of improving patent quality,
which currently is a priority of both Congress and the USPTO.
Since the Federal Circuit recently denied a request for an en
banc rehearing of Nuiften,283 the signal claim at issue may have
seen its last day in court unless the Supreme Court grants
certiorari. Nevertheless, the case of In re Bilski284 that is currently
before the Federal Circuit may have some important implications
for the patentability of signals. Bilski came before the Federal
Circuit as an appeal from the BPAI, which considered the
patentability of a claim relating to a method for managing the price
risk of energy trading. 285 The feature that distinguished this claim
from the inventions held patentable in State Street and Excel was
that the method was "non-machine-implemented"-in other words,
it was neither claimed nor described as requiring a digital computer
and could be performed entirely by human mental activity.286 The
BPAI, however, found the invention unpatentable under § 101 not
because the claim failed to recite a computer but because the
claimed process neither produced a physical transformation nor
tied the abstract idea of risk management to a practical
application.2 87 The BPAI also provided an extensive discussion of
various tests for patentable subject matter under § 101, including
the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test applied in State
Street and Excel.288
After hearing arguments but prior to issuing a decision, the
Federal Circuit issued sua sponte an order for an en banc hearing
of the appeal.289 In addition to the specific claim at issue, the court
also requested parties to file supplemental briefs on broader issues
283 In re Nuijten, 515 F.3d 1361, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (order denying petition
for rehearing en banc).
284 No. 2007-1130, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3246 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 2008)
(order granting en banc hearing of appeal).
285 Exparte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, Application No. 08/833,892, slip op. at 2
(B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006).
286 Id. at 6.
287 Id. at 58, 62 ("[A] method can be statutory subject matter without a
machine.").
288 Id. at 5-34.
289 In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 3246, at *1 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 15, 2008).
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such as the standard for determining when a process is patentable
under § 101 and whether any holdings of State Street or Excel
should be reconsidered or overruled. 290 Although nominally directed
toward the patentability of processes rather than manufactures as in
Nuiten, the en banc decision in Bilski may set a broad standard for
patentability of computer-related processes that may provide
relevant guidelines for future Federal Circuit panels considering
issues similar to those raised in Nuijten. Furthermore, the issues in
Bilski are framed broadly enough that an eventual appeal of the en
banc ruling to the Supreme Court would not be unanticipated. If
this does occur, then it would provide a perfect opportunity for the
Court to affirm Chakrabarty and Diehr and further clarify the
scope of patentable subject matter under § 101 as it did for the
non-obviousness requirement of § 103 in KSR. In particular, the
Court would do well to articulate whether the enumerated
categories in the statute are merely another way to divide "new and
useful" inventions. If it does, then future Federal Circuit cases
involving patentability of signals may be decided in a manner more
consistent with O'Reilly than with Nuijten.
290 Id. at *2.
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